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Abstract
In the medieval era of religious and political tumult that culminated with the Crusades,
(mostly) Roman Catholic Western European citizens from all walks of life committed
themselves to conquer Jerusalem and wrest control of historically Christian lands from the
Muslim polities that claimed the region. The historical Kingdom of France was a major
contributor to the Crusades, and as such, the feudal realms established in the Levant in the wake
of the First Crusade were dominated by former French crusaders and citizenry. The geographic
boundaries and demography of these Crusader States are reminiscent of French hegemony in the
Middle East after the First World War. Thus, this project assesses the similarities, differences,
continuity, and change between French control of the Outremer as a result of the First Crusade,
and the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon as seen through the colonial experiences of
both French administrators, crusaders, and chroniclers, and those of autochthonous nations.

Keywords: the Crusades, the Levant, the Outremer, the French Mandate, Syria, Lebanon,
France, colonialism, imperialism, paternalism
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“Consider, I pray, and reflect bow in our time God has transferred the West into the East, For we
who were Occidentals now have been made Orientals. He who was a Roman or a Frank is now a
Galilaean, or an inhabitant of Palestine. One who was a citizen of Rheims or of Chartres now has
been made a citizen of Tyre or of Antioch. We have already forgotten the places of our birth;
already they have become unknown to many of us…”
-

Fulcher of Chartres, 1124

“To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under
the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples
not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there
should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a
sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be
embodied in this Covenant. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the
tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their
resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility,
and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as
Mandatories on behalf of the League.”
-

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919
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Introduction
The Crusades began in the 11th century. During these successive waves of migration,
armed pilgrimage, and military campaigns, hundreds of thousands of Europeans over hundreds
of years assailed and conquered the Levant - a rough historical and geographical region along the
western coast of the Middle East comprising modern-day Israel and Palestine, Syria, Lebanon,
and Jordan. The Crusades themselves, in retrospect were quite unsuccessful. Muslim countries
retain sovereignty over much of the Middle East, and moreover the Levant has not been
controlled by militant agents of the Roman Catholic Church since the last Crusader State fell in
1291. However, despite their seeming lack of success as measured by permanent conquest and
suzerainty, the Crusades have nonetheless imprinted unto Western and Muslim cultures a multifaceted cultural memory. Indeed, the image of the mighty crusader king, accompanied by his
loyal retinue of knights, opposing the heathens of the Levant is the sort of quintessential
culmination of romanticized elements of the Middle Ages. Historical figures like Richard “the
Lionheart” of England, Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, and Sultan of Egypt and
Syria Yusuf ibn Ayyub ibn Shadi (better known as Saladin) retain an aura of romanticism and
heroism. In popular thought, the crusades are remembered as a scrum of heroic warriors,
chivalry, and a struggle between two ostensibly diametrically opposed forces.
Of course, cultural memories take many different forms. While for some, the Crusades
may embody this pinnacle of medieval warfare, they carry very different meanings for others.
Within the cultural memory of more contemporary Arab nationalists and Islamic academia, the
Crusades are remembered for the ruthlessness of Christian knights sweeping across land that had
belonged to Muslim nations for hundreds of years. Furthermore, this cultural memory of the
Crusades is considered to be the beginning of a long historical struggle between Islam and

4
Christianity that would permeate throughout history thereafter.1 Contrarily, more populist, rightwing elements of European and Euro-American political thought recall the Crusades as a
righteous struggle against an irredeemable great enemy: Islam. Images of the Crusade are
conjured to promote the idea that Christianity is under religious and cultural assault by Islam.2
From the most romantic memories of heroism to those of antipathy and self-righteous
admiration, the legacy of the Crusades embodies a diverse range of political and historical
thought. But, when pondering the Crusades, what rarely comes to mind is an association with
maritime colonial European empires of old. “Colonialism” is a word with which we as
Americans are very familiar. After all, the United States began its history as a colony of the
British Empire until it successfully won its independence in the late 18th century. This is the
context most closely associated with the words “colonialism” or “colonization”: the overseas
expansion of Western European powers beginning in the late 15th century that resulted in
cultural, economic, and political hegemony over much of the world. However numerous other
examples of colonization, and thereby modes of imperialism, exist in the crucible of the human
story.
Hundreds of years after the Crusades, European hegemony resurfaced in the Middle East
with the establishment of the Mandate system. The United Kingdom and France were both given
dominion over great swaths of the Middle East under the guise of aiding these territories in the
creation of independent states. In reality, the polities under British and French control were
essentially vassals of their respective suzerain. While the Mandates for Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and
Palestine were all theoretically temporary, as issued by the League of Nations, the idea of these
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states becoming independent under the supposed guiding hands of European empires was naïve
and disingenuous at worst. Much like the French crusaders who captured and controlled the
Crusader States of the Levant, French imperialists had no desire to give up control of the same
region.3
The Outremer, the collection of Crusader States, and the French Mandate, the collection
of protectorates under varying degrees of French control, share many superficial and
fundamental similarities. The geographic boundaries of the Outremer are very similar to those of
the French Mandate, including part of modern-day Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon (all within the
Levant). Moreover, the cultural make-up of both the minority hegemonic force and the native
population has remained much the same in the hundreds of years between the Crusades and the
Mandate. The crusaders and administrators of the Outremer were largely made up of Roman
Catholic French-speaking peasants and nobility. Likewise, the bureaucrats of the French
Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon were also largely, if not entirely, ethnically French and
Catholic. The citizenry of both the Crusader States and the Mandate contained a majority
Muslim Arab population, with notable Christian minorities of non-Catholic and non-Protestant
denominations, as well as Jews and Druze. Both the Crusader States and the French Mandate
were melting pots of Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Alawite, Maronite, Muslim, Druze, Arab,
Jewish, Assyrian, Greek, Armenian, and Circassian populations.
Thus, unique and yet parallel stories of colonialism and imperialism emerged along the
western banks of the Middle East, the Levant. The Outremer and the French Mandate, despite
being separated by hundreds of years, share similar fundamental historical trends and themes of
colonialism, imperialism, and paternalism oft forgotten within greater scrums of cultural and

Charles River Editors, The French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon: The History and Legacy of France’s
Administration of the Levant after World War I (Charles River Editors, 2019), 35.
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historical recollection. The history of the crusades is one of bygone colonialism, a bookmark that
sets the beginning of France’s storied future with empire building, a story that ends with its final
colonial acquisition: the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon.4

I.

The First Crusade
The Foundation of Holy War
The Crusades were a series of religious wars most often directed by the Roman Catholic

Church. They lasted hundreds of years, beginning with the First Crusade in 1095 and ending in
the 15th century. The myriad religious conflicts that counted amongst the Crusades are as diverse
in purpose as they are in number; while the most famous Crusades were launched against the
Muslim polities of the Middle East, there were numerous other calls to crusade against pagan
Baltic peoples in Northern Europe, as well as minor crusades against Christian sects that
attempted to break communion with the Catholic Church prior to the Protestant Reformation.5
The most salient of these Crusades for the purpose of exploring the French relationship with
early forms of colonialism and imperialism will be the First Crusade. However, before such a
relationship can be thoroughly explored, it is important to understand the origin of not only the
First Crusade itself, but also the ethos and mythos that drove thousands of Europeans - regardless
of ethnicity, language, and homeland – to take up arms and rally behind the call to crusade in the
11th century.
The impetus for the First Crusade began far from the Roman Catholic Realms of Europe.
In the centuries preceding the First Crusade in 1095, the Byzantine (or Eastern Roman) Empire

The official name for the French Mandate is “The Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon.” The definite article is
retained when referring to the official name, but general usage of Lebanon as a country or region will not use the
definite article.
5 Erik Christiansen, The Northern Crusades (Penguin Books, 1997), 287.
4
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had been locked in numerous struggles for control of the Levant and Anatolia with multitudinous
Muslim powers. Greek Orthodox Byzantine emperors and Muslim caliphs waged countless wars
over this region since the rise of Islam in the 7th century. In the 11th century, the Fatimid
Caliphate of Egypt captured Jerusalem from the Byzantines, isolating the region from Christian
rule for the first time in centuries. The Fatimids were, however, largely tolerant of Christian
pilgrims journeying to Jerusalem.6 Thus, the Fatimids’ conquest of Jerusalem failed to spark a
crusade or any sort of medieval “international incident” or large-scale controversy. A turning
point in this relationship occurred when a second Muslim polity usurped Fatimid control of the
Levant and annexed the region, including Jerusalem. This new usurper, the Great Seljuk Empire,
originating from the steppes of Transoxiana in Central Asia, had subjugated Persia,
Mesopotamia, and now the Levant by the mid-11th century. The Seljuks controlled a massive
empire, stretching from Anatolia in the west to modern-day Afghanistan in the east. Unlike the
Fatimid Egyptians, the Seljuk Turks were far less tolerant of Christian pilgrims. Many
contemporaneous Christian pilgrims observed and recorded the change in relations after the
Seljuks seized control of the Holy Land, specifically noting incidents of harassment and
persecution targeting Christians.7 Moreover, the Seljuk Empire had ambitions to expand into the
Byzantine Empire, seizing the strategically (and to many Christians spiritually) important city of
Antioch as well as beginning Turkic migration into Anatolia. Byzantine Emperor Alexios
Komnenos (c. 1057 – 1118), fearing future invasions from his empire’s new rival to the east, sent
envoys to Rome petitioning Pope Urban II (c. 1035- 1099) for aid. The stage was now set for the
First Crusade.
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In the years leading up to Pope Urban’s call to crusade, one might expect that Western
Europe was abuzz with a ravenous religious fervor, a desire to launch their hordes of armed
pilgrims into Jerusalem without a second thought, especially considering the Seljuk’s conquest
of the Holy Land. This could not be further from the truth. While Turkish control of the Levant
resulted in some euro-centric consternation, this alone was not enough to spark interest in a
crusade amongst the populations of Europe. Contrary to what might be easily imagined with the
benefit of historical hindsight, before the First Crusade, Christians and Muslims did not view
each other with irretrievable animosity. Neither Roman Catholic nor Greek Orthodox Christians
perceived Muslims as a sort of religious “nemesis” to be vanquished and vice versa.8 Even the
Byzantine Empire, which had waged war with Muslim states for centuries viewed them with no
more animosity than their Slavic, Christian rivals in the Balkans against whom the Byzantines
had also had numerous conflicts.9
The seeds that would soon blossom into the call to the First Crusade were sown by Pope
Gregory VII (c. 1015 – 1085). Gregory was a strong advocate for the supremacy of the Papacy
over all matters spiritual and secular in Western Europe, which unsurprisingly made him an
opponent of the feudal lords of Europe who wished to retain primacy in (secular) matters of the
state. Beginning in 1075, Pope Gregory VII butted heads multiple times with his foremost
political rival, Holy Roman Emperor Heinrich IV. In the Middle Ages, church and state were
intrinsically linked, and there was no better exemplar of this relationship than the Holy Roman
Emperor. Heinrich’s political station as Holy Roman Emperor was inexorably linked with the
Papacy, as it was traditional for the Pope to crown newly anointed Holy Roman Emperors.
Heinrich’s predecessor was heavily involved in the election of new Popes, which Heinrich IV
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tried to replicate, attempting to depose Gregory VII from the Papacy. In response, Pope Gregory
excommunicated Heinrich, beginning a power struggle of back-and-forth excommunications and
illegitimate Popes that lasted years. This conflict ultimately cemented the Pope’s supreme
authority in spiritual matters (e.g., the appointment of bishops and papal election by cardinals),
but it also left the Catholic Church in a weakened position. While Western Europe was still
steeped in devotion to the Christian faith, the people of Western Europe’s trust in the institution
of the Papacy had waned amidst Gregory VII’s petty bickering with Heinrich IV.10
Before dying in 1085, Gregory VII lamented the recent Great Schism between the Roman
Catholic and Greek Orthodox Churches, as well as the Seljuk conquest of Jerusalem. Pursuant to
his firm belief in inalienable papal supremacy, Gregory VII wished to bring the Greek Orthodox
Church back into communion with the Roman Catholic Church (the two churches formally split
in 1054) and sought to reclaim Jerusalem for Christendom. While he was successful in
ameliorating relations between the Papacy and Byzantium, he failed to excite Western Europe
into a Holy War. Gregory VII began planning a Christian military campaign to “liberate”
Jerusalem and the Holy Land from the Seljuk Turks, but this was never realized. Both Gregory
VII and Urban II faced difficulty in rallying any significant numbers of Christians to engage in
Holy War or Crusade. Medieval Catholic knights ironically considered acts of bloodshed one
would commit in a war to be inherently sinful. Moreover, medieval knights and commanders had
very little experience launching long, protracted military campaigns which would inevitably be
required for an invasion of the Levant.11 Gregory VII proclaimed a call to arms in 1074, citing
the need for the Catholics to defend their Christian brothers-in-arms against the Seljuk Turks, but
this was ultimately unsuccessful. The reasons behind the lack of success are somewhat unclear,
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although it has been suggested that Gregory VII’s desire to personally lead and direct the war
was to blame, his personal and political ambitions getting the better of him.12 While Gregory VII
failed to coalesce the political and religious realities of his time into a crusade, he nonetheless
laid the theoretical foundation for such a call to arms. It would be Pope Urban II who perfected
Gregory VII’s rhetoric and made manifest the First Crusade.13

The Call to Crusade
In March of 1095, Pope Urban II received a message from Byzantine Emperor Alexios
Komnenos. Alexios requested financial and military aid for a campaign against the Seljuk Turks,
whose empire had recently annexed many former Byzantine territories in Anatolia and the
Levant.14 Pope Urban II’s response came several months later, in November of that same year
when he delivered in the French town of Clermont a formal call to crusade. His speech would
rouse the crowd, inspiring Europeans across the continent. Tens of thousands of men, women,
and children were galvanized to engage in armed pilgrimage, the First Crusade. But what
changed? Why was Pope Urban’s speech at Clermont infinitely more successful than previous
attempts by his predecessors?
The answer to that question is ironically somewhat indicative of modern views and
misunderstandings about the Crusades, particularly the Frist Crusade. To simply call the
Crusades military campaigns, wars, or efforts of forced evangelism would be inaccurate, each
term failing to grasp the full scope of what the Crusades actually meant to the contemporaneous
participants thereof. Pope Gregory VII, in trying to hone his vision of Holy War, made the
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mistake of over-politicizing the concept. Christian theologians and philosophers had theorized
for centuries about the concept of a theoretical war to defend and protect the interests of
Christendom, although such a concept is anathema to the peaceful teachings of Jesus of
Nazareth. A 4th century bishop, St. Augustine of Hippo, theorized that a war waged by Christians
could be fought under “lawful” or “just conditions,” however this theory fell short of sanctioning
a former declaration of a Holy War or a Crusade.15 Gregory VII was unable to refine the views
of St. Augustine. Instead, his call for a Holy War against the perceived enemies of Christianity
was rhetorically based on constructing a military arm of the Papacy. His radical approach to a
casus belli alienated Christian population of Europe, thus his rallying cry failed to garner any
meaningful support. Pope Gregory wanted a war, a massive military campaign under battlefield
Papal command against the Muslim world, but such a desire was simply not shared by Europeans
of the time.
Where Pope Urban II succeeded where Gregory VII failed was in how he contextualized
the Crusades, not only in religious doctrine, but also the greater milieu of Europe at the time.
Urban II, much like his predecessor, lamented the disunity of Christendom, both within the
Roman Catholic Church and without. They both sought to repair the Great Schism which had
irrevocably split the Catholic and Orthodox churches, and Pope Urban II also sought to quell the
petty infighting of feudal lords within the realm of Roman Catholic Europe. Moreover, Europe in
the 11th century was deeply entrenched in a culture of fire-and-brimstone superstition. The 11th
century marked one millennium since the crucifixion and death of Jesus of Nazareth, which
infused Western Europeans with a seemingly omnipresent dread of an impending apocalypse.
Europeans felt a pulpable anxiety, fearing that the “End of Days” had arrived. Peasant and noble
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alike feared that they would be judged as sinful and unworthy to enter Heaven upon death. This
fear was so tangible in 11th century Europe, that even the most notorious, violent, and maniacal
feudal warlords sought pilgrimage to Jerusalem to cleanse their souls of sin.16 Pope Urban II’s
rhetoric at his speech of Clermont thus took advantage of two things: the failures of Gregory VII
and the fear of damnation that held Catholic Europe in a strangle-hold.
Urban II framed his call to crusade before the crowd at Clermont as such: this armed
pilgrimage to the Holy Land would sanctify the souls of its participants. While no transcript of
Urban’s speech survives, eyewitness testimony recalls a transfixed crowd as Pope Urban
lamented that Christianity itself was threatened by the invasion and oppression of the Muslims.
He demonized the Muslim Turks and other non-Christian inhabitants of the Middle East, citing
their occupation as a brutally oppressive regime, committing ritual torture upon native Christians
and Christian pilgrims alike.17 His demonization of Muslim civilizations was a unique fixture of
this call to arms, which served as a deeply resonant clarion call to persuade Catholic Europeans
that a holy struggle against Muslims was preferable to fighting a fellow Christian.18 Furthermore,
Pope Urban pleaded with the people of Europe to unite, to band together to protect and answer
the call of Emperor Alexios Komnenos, to defend their Greek Orthodox brethren of the
Byzantine Empire who had fallen under the dominion of the Seljuk Turks. Finally, Urban
concluded that the reclamation of the Holy Land for Latin Christendom would purge any
participants’ souls of sin. When Emperor Alexios solicited aid from Pope Urban II, he expected
perhaps a small force of knights and peasant militias. Instead, he received tens of thousands of
armed pilgrims, or crusaders, prepared to rout the Seljuk Turks.
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Pope Urban II’s call to crusade, by all accounts, checked all the boxes. His sermon at
Clermont was the primary catalyst for the First Crusade, and the key to this success was framing
the Crusade in a religious context. Unlike Gregory VII, Urban II did not construe the First
Crusade as a military campaign overseen by the Pope. Urban II’s demonization of Muslims, and
appeal to the prevalent superstitious fear of damnation ensured that this “just war” would be
viewed by contemporary Europeans as a war of salvation, a pilgrimage to cleanse their souls.
This is especially important to note. The terms “crusade” and “crusader” are somewhat
anachronistic. Urban II, and even the participants of the First Crusade, did not refer to
themselves as such. Gregory VII and Urban II’s projects for “Holy War” were so novel at the
time of their inception that no contemporary word existed at first to describe them. The first
crusades were known in their eras as an iter or peregrinato, meaning journey and pilgrimage
respectively. The term “crusader” (from the French word croisade, meaning “way of the cross”)
only emerged at the end of the twelfth century, almost a century after Pope Urban II’s speech at
Clermont. The retroactive application of the word “crusade” or “crusader” to the First Crusade
can result in somewhat misleading phraseology, particularly in the forthcoming context of
colonialism and imperialism. The participants of the First Crusade committed undeniably violent
acts of warfare on their campaigns across the Levant. Unlike future Europeans who knowingly
waged wars of conquest for the acquisition of wealth and imperial gains – perhaps exemplified
by the Spanish conquest of the Americas, the establishment of colonial estates therein, and the
mass seizure of gold thereafter – those who fought in the First Crusade did so with the
irretrievable ethos of religious salvation. The participants of the First Crusade included soldiers
and non-combatants; Pope Urban II’s sermon at Clermont imbued an ontological aspect of
pilgrimage, as opposed to evangelism or scorched earth campaigns, into the First Crusade. The
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goal of the First Crusade was the same for those who were armed and those who were not: the
promise of a transcendent penance to consecrate the spirit.19

The Outremer
The First Crusade effectively ended in 1099 with the siege and subsequent capture of
Jerusalem by the crusading forces. The Kingdom of Jerusalem was established shortly thereafter,
although not before the wanton massacre of the city’s inhabitants. Upon entering the city, the
assaulting force of Crusaders slaughtered Jerusalem’s former defenders, as well as
indiscriminately murdering Muslim and Jewish citizens.20 Although there would be minor battles
and skirmishes after the Siege of Jerusalem, the First Crusade was essentially over. No united
Muslim counterattack (or jihad) was launched to reclaim Jerusalem or the territories captured by
the crusaders. The Islamic world of the late 11th and early 12th centuries was far too disunified to
organize a response akin to Pope Urban II’s rally at Clermont, but contemporary Muslims also
viewed the Crusades much differently than their Christian neighbors. There is little evidence to
suggest the First Crusade was seen by the Muslim world at the time as a significant event or that
Muslim leaders even recognized the religious motivations of the crusaders. 12th century accounts
of Muslim writers instead suggest that the Arab and Turkic authorities of the region simply
viewed the crusaders as merely a mercenary force employed by the Byzantine Empire attempting
to reclaim lost territories.21
The Levant was now firmly in the hands of the crusaders and the Crusader States they
had established: the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the County of Edessa, and the Principality of
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Antioch.22 Collectively, the Crusader States are referred to as the Outremer, a French term
meaning “overseas.” Although governed by Catholic Western Europeans, this new
administrative class was a minority. The autochthonous majority population were Muslim Arabs,
with sizable minorities of Greek Orthodox Christians, Syriac Christians, and Jews. The
establishment of the realms of the Outremer and informal end of the First Crusade marked a
turning point for the former crusaders. The vast majority of crusaders and armed pilgrims,
believing their sacred duty complete and their souls cleansed of sin, returned to Europe;
according to 12th century chronicler William of Tyre, only about 2,000 infantrymen and knights
remained in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.23 The new Outremer also marked a change in
historiographical recollection of the crusaders. Those who remained to settle or defend the new
Crusader States are often referred to as “Franks,” reflective of contemporary Muslim sources in
the Middle East. Muslim accounts of the First Crusade and its participants, much like their
Christian counterparts, did not use the term “crusaders.” Rather, Muslim sources also refer to the
participants of the crusades as “Franks,” as many of the now former crusaders originated from
France or otherwise former territories of the antecedent Frankish Empire of Charlemagne (which
would have also included Germanic and Italian peoples). Chronicles of the First Crusade, written
in the early 11th century, referred to the Catholic Western European crusaders as Franci
regardless of actual ethnicity or national origin. Byzantine Greek sources likewise use the
term Frangoi, and Arabic sources referred to the crusaders as al-Ifranj. An alternative term,
Latini or Latins, was also sometimes used by medieval historians and chroniclers. These
medieval exonyms serve to distinguish the settlers from the indigenous population by language
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and faith. A shift in identity thus occurred; no longer purported with the ethos and mythos of
Holy War, regardless of origin, the “settled” crusader had become the “Frank” in the
historiographical record.24
The lack of a united Muslim response to the First Crusade allowed Frankish control of
the Outremer to quickly cement. Feudal hierarchies like those in Western Europe were
established, with the monarch residing at the top of this hierarchy much like in Europe. A key
difference between the feudal hierarchies of the Outremer and those of Europe is additional
stratification based on Frankish or indigenous identity. Beginning in the early 12th century, the
title of “King of Jerusalem” became styled in addition as “king of the Latins in Jerusalem.” This
new epithet is indicative of a stark division between the Frankish settlers and indigenous
population.25
Exact information about the codified legal status or social standing of non-Frankish
populations within the Outremer is difficult to ascertain. Unsurprisingly, the Muslim inhabitants
of the Crusader States rarely appear in Roman Catholic sources. The Franks “had a natural
tendency to ignore these matters as simply without interest and certainly not worthy of record.”26
What is certain, however, is that the Franks did not overhaul indigenous institutions and entirely
supplant them with their own feudal institutions from Western Europe. The populations of the
Outremer did not fully assimilate into the culture of the crusaders, nor did the Franks fully
integrate into the culture of the Levant. From this cross-cultural contact emerged a hybridized
society wherein crusaders retained existing institutions and introduced their own customs from

Andrew D Buck, “Settlement, Identity, and Memory in the Latin East: An Examination of the Term ‘Crusader
States,’” The English Historical Review 135, no. 573 (2020): pp. 271-302, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/ceaa008, 274279.
25
Hans Eberhard Mayer, “Latins, Muslims and Greeks in the Latin Klngdom of Jerusalem,” History 63, no. 208
(1978): pp. 175-192, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-229x.1978.tb02360.x, 175.
26
Ibid.
24

17
Europe. Muslims, as well as Jews and Eastern or Greek Orthodox Christians, had virtually no
rights in rural towns and villages, where they were essentially serfs of the crusader lord who
owned the land. However, this is more indicative of continuity rather than change. Orthodox
Christians, Syriacs, and Jews in rural communities saw little change in their day-to-day lives.
The key difference upon the establishment of the Outremer is that the former Muslim overlords
of these non-Muslim populations were simply replaced by the crusaders; the main change was
therefore that Muslim Arabs and Turks now found themselves at the lowest rung of the
crusaders’ feudal hierarchy.27 Agricultural production in the Levant was regulated by the iqta, an
indigenous Muslim system of land ownership and tithe somewhat to the feudal hierarchies of
Europe, and this system was not heavily altered by the new Frankish overlords.28 Indeed, many
indigenous forms of governance were retained by the crusaders. For example, the ra’is, the
leader of native Muslim and Syriac communities, and a kind of vassal (or intermediary between
the landlord and the serfs) to whomever owned an area of land, was retained by many indigenous
communities.29
Indigenous Muslims and Orthodox Christians comprised the majority of the Outremer’s
population in the countryside, but Frankish (mainly French and Italian) colonists arrived to settle
in rural and urban areas alike.30 A fully accurate account of the demography of the Outremer
after the First Crusade is virtually impossible, however scholars Joshua Prawer and Meron
Benvenisti estimate that there were at most 120,000 Franks living in the cities of the Kingdom of
Jerusalem, with another 250,000 Muslim and Orthodox Christian serfs in the countryside.
According to this estimate, the Franks accounted for 15–25% of the total population of the
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Crusader States.31 From its inception, the Catholic Western European hegemons had always
comprised a minority of the Outremer. However, after the First Crusade, a constant flow of
settlers and new feudal lords continually arrived in the Levant, while most of the original
crusaders who fought in the First Crusade returned to Western Europe as aforementioned. The
Frankish populations of settlers who were not feudal lords, nobles, or kings constituted little
more than a colonial frontier exercising rule over the native Jewish, Muslim, Greek Orthodox,
and Syriac populations, who were more far numerous.
The feudal hierarchies and methods of governance of the Crusader States were
undoubtedly mixed systems with characteristics of Western European norms and their
autochthonous counterparts. However, the extent to which the actual cultural milieu of the
Outremer was similarly hybridized is much more nebulous and is still debated by historians.
Part of this debate stems from revisionist histories of French imperialism. In the 19th and
early 20th centuries, French historians such as E. G. Rey, Gaston Dodu, and René Grousset
argued that the Franks, Muslims, and indigenous non-Catholic Christians co-existed in a
completely integrated society. Historian Ronnie Ellenblum claims this view was greatly
influenced by French imperialism and colonialism; if French crusaders could fully integrate
themselves into the local milieu of the Middle East, then naturally the contemporaneous French
Mandate could be just as harmonious.32 After World War II, scholars such as Joshua Prawer, R.
C. Smail, Meron Benvenisti, and Claude Cahen argued that the crusaders lived totally segregated
from the autochthonous inhabitants. They argued that the Franks were under constant threat of
Arabization, Islamification, and Turkification by the native population and Muslim polities that
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surrounded the Outremer. Prawer specifically argued further that the Crusader States were an
early attempt at colonization, in which the Franks were a small ruling class, dependent on the
native population for resources, goods, and services but made no attempt to integrate therewith.
According to Prawer’s theory, the feudal and rural European society to which the crusaders were
accustomed was instead replaced by a segregationist, perhaps apartheidist urban society in the
ancient cities of the Levant.33 Historian Ronnie Ellenblum takes issue with this argument. She
posits instead that the Franks were neither totally integrated with the native populations, nor
segregated in the cities isolated from rural native communities, rather they settled in both urban
and rural areas, specifically, in areas traditionally inhabited by Greek and Syriac Christians.
Conversely, areas with large, traditionally Muslim populations had very little crusader
settlement.34 The Outremer undoubtedly contained multicultural societies which produced
syncretic systems of governance, but the true extent to which the Frankish lords and settlers
assimilated into the culture of the indigenous Muslims, Jews, and Christians (and vice versa) is
still unknown.

Crusade and Colony
With the motivations of the first crusaders laid bare, and context into their governance of
the Outremer given, it comes time to introspect. Can the First Crusade be considered a form of
early colonialism? Can one say that the Crusader States of the Outremer were colonies? The
topic of whether or not the Crusades can be considered a sort of early colonialism or protocolonialism is hotly debated by historical scholars. The aforementioned historian Joshua Prawer
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strongly believed that the Crusades represented a “trial run” of sorts for European colonialism
and imperialism in the Americas. On the other hand, American author John Green believes that
such a view is misguided. Green argues that “the crusades were not an example of early
European colonization of the Middle East… that’s a much later post- and anti-colonialist view
that comes at least in part from a Marxist reading of history.”35 Much like the extent to which the
Franks integrated and assimilated with the indigenous populations of the Levant, the connection
between the crusades and colonialism is similarly nebulous in academia and is thus the subject of
ongoing debate. The link between crusade and colony is not as definitive as a “yes or no”
answer, but instead requires introspection into more theoretical aspects of colonialism.
It seems that part of the reason why the classification of the crusades as an early form of
colonialism is so controversial is because of how we perceive colonialism. The word itself can
mean many different things to many different people based on their own experiences and cultural
memories. An American, for example, will probably associate colonialism with the European
conquest and settlement of ostensibly empty land in the New World and the replacement of its
native population with European settlers. While this is undoubtedly an example of colonialism,
one to which the Outremer and the crusades do not conform, it would be illogical to claim that
the crusades cannot represent any form of colonialism simply because they do not align with
one’s pre-conceived notions of colonialism.
Is it possible to construct a more neutral definition of colonialism? Certainly, the word
itself is not bound by the cultural mores and implicit biases of the nations which participated
therein or benefited therefrom. Collins English Dictionary defines colonialism as “the practice
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by which a powerful country directly controls less powerful countries and uses their resources to
increase its own power and wealth.”36 Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary defines colonialism as
“the system or policy of a nation seeking to extend or retain its authority over other people or
territories.”37 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary provides several germane definitions, including
“something characteristic of a colony” and “control by one power over a dependent area or
people.”38 Aiming for a definition that specifically applies to European history, the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines colonialism as “the process of European settlement and
political control over the rest of the world, including the Americas, Australia, and parts of Africa
and Asia.” Lastly, German historian Jürgen Osterhammel arrived at the following definition,
which will be the most salient: “[c]olonialism is a relationship between an indigenous (or
forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions
affecting the lives of the colonised people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in
pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises
with the colonised population, the colonisers are convinced of their own superiority and their
ordained mandate to rule.”39
There is key differentiation in methodology between the settlement of the Outremer and
the colonization of the Americas (the form of colonialism with which most are likely familiar).
The colonization of the Americas was largely state-sponsored. Specific companies like the
Virginia Company, alongside European monarchies, financed voyages and settlement. Such
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economic sponsorship, as well as state involvement evidently requires advanced economies with
a burgeoning middle class and a centralized state. Medieval European polities (including the
Outremer) at the time of the crusades were still entrenched in the economics of feudalism; there
was no true middle-class or framework for privately-owned institutions that could sponsor
colonial enterprises nor was there a centralized state whose governance was based on feudal
obligations and hierarchies rather than a central bureaucracy for administrative governance.40

It would however be folly to deny the fact that settlement and colonization of the region,
by any definition, occurred in the Outremer. The Franks who settled in the Outremer
occasionally created new settlements rather than settling in cities or villages that had already
been inhabited for centuries. One example of this is the village of Bethgibelin, which former
crusaders founded around 1136. Bethgibelin was established about one or two generations after
the First Crusade; much like the familiar stories of settlers in Jamestown and Plymouth in North
America, there were Europeans who were born in the Outremer and founded new settlements
therein. While individual countries and feudal polities were unable to organize colonies in the
Middle Ages, there were organizations that acted as surrogates for the colonial companies and
enterprises of later centuries: military orders. These military orders (e.g., the Knights Hospitaller,
the Knights Templar, the Teutonic Knights) were very wealthy organizations which received
funding from European nobles to protect pilgrims and participate in the crusades. The wealth and
resources that these military orders accumulated even surpassed those of some European
monarchs and so were more than capable of establishing colonies in the Outremer. Bethgibelin,
for example, received funding by the Knights Hospitaller to facilitate Frankish settlement.41 The
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Frankish settlers originated from “Auvergne, Gascony, Flanders, Lombardy and Catalonia.
Generally, the largest number of European settlers...were from the central, southern and western
parts of France, and a few also from northern Spain and regions in Italy. In Bethgibelin the other
settlers were from nearby Latin villages [in the Outremer].”42 Whole generations of Franks were
born in the Levant. For many of the Franks and crusaders who settled in the Crusader States,
towns such as Bethgibelin were meant to be a new permanent home. Much akin to rhetoric one
would expect to see when describing 19th century New York or Boston, chronicler Fulcher of
Chartres in 1124 described the settlement of the Outremer as such:

Consider, I pray, and reflect bow in our time God has transferred the West into the East,
For we who were Occidentals now have been made Orientals. He who was a Roman or a
Frank is now a Galilaean, or an inhabitant of Palestine. One who was a citizen of Rheims
or of Chartres now has been made a citizen of Tyre or of Antioch. We have already
forgotten the places of our birth; already they have become unknown to many of us, or, at
least, are unmentioned. Some already possess here homes and servants which they have
received through inheritance. Some have taken wives not merely of their own people, but
Syrians, or Armenians, or even Saracens who have received the grace of baptism. Some
have with them father-in-law, or daughter-in-law, or son-in-law, or stepson, or stepfather. There are here, too, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. One cultivates vines,
another the fields. The one and the other use mutually the speech and the idioms of the
different languages. Different languages, now made common, become known to both
races, and faith unites those whose forefathers were strangers. As it is written, “The lion
and the ox shall eat straw together.” Those who were strangers are now natives; and he
who was a sojourner now has become a resident, Our parents and relatives from day to
day come to join us, abandoning, even though reluctantly, all that they possess. For those
who were poor there, here God makes rich. Those who had few coins, here possess
countless besants; and those who had not had a villa, here, by the gift of God, already
possess a city. Therefore why should one who has found the East so favorable return to
the West? God does not wish those to suffer want who, carrying their crosses, have
vowed to follow Him, nay even unto the end. You see, therefore, that this is a great
miracle, and one which must greatly astonish the whole world. Who has ever heard
anything like it?43
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One vital difference between the Outremer and its colonial counterparts of the Early
Modern Era is the lack of a metropolis. The Thirteen Colonies, for example, clearly belonged to
Great Britain. The British Empire was financially and politically responsible for its ownership,
maintenance, and defense. Likewise, the colony of New Spain in modern day Mexico was
clearly a colony of Spain. The Spanish Empire owned its colony in full and its colonial holdings
were unquestionably under the Spanish Crown. European colonies in the Americas, Africa, and
Asia were in turn expected to provide their mother country or metropolis with materials, raw
resources, etc. Conversely, the Outremer had no metropolis. There was no expectation that the
Kingdom of Jerusalem provide the Kingdom of France with anything. In the Outremer, the
colony and the metropolis were one and the same. The colonies of the Crusader States, by nature
of Europe’s feudal system, were not sponsored by any one country. The colony-metropolis
relationship that emerged after the 15th century simply did not exist in the Middle Ages. Rather,
colonization was driven by individuals and the wealth of crusader military orders. Wealth
extraction was certainly expected; Muslim and Christian peasants alike were still bound by
feudal obligations to farm the land upon which they resided. Similarly, the Crusader States
engaged in extensive trade with the wealthy merchant republics of Italy. These city-states (such
as Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Amalfi) had their own quarters in cities of the Outremer and
established trading colonies to amplify their own wealth.44
Another important distinction between the Outremer and the colonies of the Americas,
Africa, and Asia is the motivation of the colonizers and settlers. European colonialism in these
continents was driven by explicit paternalism and greed. No matter the continent, European
powers in the 15th century and beyond were clear in their goals of acquiring land and colonies.
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The early modern maritime empires sought only to expand their reach throughout the world,
enhance the wealth of the nation, and perhaps most saliently bring “civilization” to what was
perceived as “uncivilized” regions of the world. The crusaders did not share these desires in their
establishment of the Outremer. Even motivators that seem to be shared between the crusaders
and their future colonial counterparts, such as religion, are quite different. The Europeans who
established colonies in the New World and elsewhere sought to forcibly convert the indigenous
populations to Christianity. Conversely, the crusaders had no evangelist design; converting the
indigenous Muslim population of the Levant to Christianity was not amongst even the most
fanatic crusader’s agenda.45 Likewise, the crusaders had no paternalist concept of the “white
man’s burden,” the drive of European colonists to engage in “civilizing missions” to brutally
force native populations to adapt to the culture of the colonizers. Unlike future colonists, the
crusaders did not delude themselves into thinking that the land which they were invading was
“virgin land” or “uncivilized.”46
Is the Outremer a form of colonialism then? The answer is dispositive: the Outremer
established a civilization wherein a non-native, minority administrative class arrived to govern
the larger majority population. The majority, native population was granted fewer rights than the
incoming colonists, while the conquerors or “colonizers” established their own settlements and
through various means funded the further settlement of the Outremer with more non-native
populations whose ideology and national identity most closely conformed to that of the
colonizers. As demonstrated by Fulcher of Chartres, settled crusaders or Franks who did not
share a national or religious identity with the native populations came to think of themselves as
“natives” and cast-off affiliation with their former homes. The fact that this form of colonialism
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differs in one or two significant ways from its more iconic forms of colonialism in the Americas,
Africa, and Asia is a non-issue. The Outremer and the Crusader States were undoubtedly
examples of early European colonialism. This does not mean that the Outremer contributed to
European colonization elsewhere, nor does it mean that the colonization of the Americas, Africa,
and Asia was a direct continuation of the colonialism of the Outremer. Recall Osterhammel’s
definition of colonialism (see page 21). The Outremer does not neatly fit into this definition. It
contained instances of syncretic compromise in the creation of its feudal hierarchies. The
Crusader States furthermore were neither beholden to a distant metropolis nor to one European
power. Yet the most fundamental aspect of colonialism is true of the Outremer: a relationship
between an indigenous majority and a minority of foreign invaders wherein these invaders are
driven to settle and colonize new land for their own interests. The Crusader States certainly fit
the definition of “colonialism” as we in the 21st century understand it, but this definition would
certainly be unknown to 11th century Europeans. A colony by any other name is still a colony,
thus the issue and aforementioned controversy amongst historians in classifying the Crusades as
“colonial” is a matter of semantics. Rather than retroactively applying terms such as
“colonialism” to medieval phenomena, perhaps a more inclusive term is needed to account for
biases acquired via historical hindsight.
Unfortunately for the Franks and successive waves of crusaders, the Outremer was not to
last. Saladin, the Sultan of Egypt and Syria, restored Muslim rule to much of the Levant in the
mid-late 11th century. The Franks of Jerusalem suffered a decisive defeat in 1187, which marked
a turning point for the Outremer. The realms therein continued to lose territory to encroaching
Muslim states and were also riven by petty disputes among the Frankish nobility. Year after year
did the Outremer slowly decay until it finally collapsed in the 13th century. The Principality
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Antioch and the County of Tripoli had both ceased to exist by the 1290s. In 1291, almost 200
years after Pope Urban II’s sermon at Clermont, the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt put an end to the
Crusader States. The Mamluks swept across the Kingdom of Jerusalem in a series of victories;
important cities such as Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut quickly capitulated to the Egyptian Sultanate
without resistance. In 1298, the last Crusader State fell as the Mamluks captured Edessa. To
solidify their hold over the Levant, the Mamluks sought to eliminate any physical trace of
crusader settlement and rule. Ports and towns established by the Frankish settlers were sought
out and destroyed, and descendants of those who settled in the region centuries earlier were
forced to flee to Western Europe or nearby Cyprus.47 Uncontested Muslim rule had been restored
to the Levant after centuries of on-and-off struggles with the Franks and would-be crusaders. Yet
the dismantling of the Outremer was not the end of European hegemony in the Levant.

II.

The Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon
The Sykes-Picot Agreement
In the 20th century, Western European influence once again came to dominate the Middle

East, centuries after Pope Urban II’s sermon at Clermont had faded from the memories of
Europeans, cemented by the dismantling of the Crusader States by Muslim empires. This time,
however, the form of conquest and control was quite different. Following the Crusades, centuries
of economic, political, and social development had led to new concepts of nationalism and
imperialism in Europe, whereas the notion of launching a religious “crusade” had long since
been lost. The Mandate System was now the primary institution driving European hegemony in
the Middle East.
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The Mandates that granted France and Great Britain control over the Middle East were
created after the First World War, but their origins are far more clandestine. World War I
famously saw Europe embroiled in a conflict of its own making, the culmination of decades of
political tensions, entangled alliances, and rampant military build-up. The Mandates were
originally conceived during the war as France and Britain campaigned against their enemy in the
conflict: the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans had sided with Germany against France and
Britain, so as the war was ending the governments of both countries plotted to carve-up the
Ottoman Empire upon its defeat and occupy its former territories. Thus, French and British
diplomats engaged in a long series of backroom deals beginning in 1915. French diplomat
François Georges-Picot and British diplomat Mark Sykes were instrumental in orchestrating the
eventual framework for the French and British Mandates. The British and French governments
finalized their agreement to divide the Middle East between themselves in 1916, under the
famous Sykes-Picot Agreement. The agreement promised control of Palestine, Jordan, and
Mesopotamia (now Iraq) to the British and France would be allocated Syria, Lebanon, and part
of southeastern Turkey.48 While no territorial exchange was official until the end of World War I
in 1918, the League of Nations ultimately gave the French and British control of what was
outlined by the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
The Sykes-Picot agreement and the Mandatory territories that resulted therefrom did not
occur without controversy. Arab nationalists were outraged that the British had reneged upon
previous agreements made during the war.49 Indeed, in exchange for Arab military support
against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, the British had promised that they
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would sponsor the creation of an independent Arab state. Instead, the Arabs who had fought
alongside the British against their Ottoman hegemons now found themselves under British and
French hegemony. In the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Mandates thereafter, both France and
Great Britain ignored previous promises to Arab leaders.
Unsurprisingly, French and British authorities did not take the will of the native peoples
of the Levant into account whilst formulating their secret agreements. Before the Mandates were
finalized by the League of Nations, the United States launched an independent investigation to
determine the best course of action for governing the region after dismantling Ottoman authority.
This investigation was referred to as the 1919 Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey
but is more informally known as the King-Crane Commission. The commission sent its members
to Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Anatolia to investigate popular sentiment regarding the
impending Mandates. Published in 1922, the results of the King-Crane Commission found that
the population of the Middle East overwhelmingly opposed the Mandates.50 According to the
results of the commission, independence was the most preferred choice followed by American
occupation as a second choice, British occupation as a third choice, and French occupation was
the fourth, least popular choice.51 The King-Crane Commission was not totally impartial; the
commission’s leaders Henry King and Charles Crane believed that the nations of the Middle East
were not ready for de facto independence. However, Henry King also recognized that dividing
the region into protectorates under the suzerainty of colonial empires like France and Great
Britain would also not be beneficial for the region.52 King believed that the most amiable
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solution to the issue of governance in the Middle East was for the United States to oversee the
region, but this notion was naturally rejected by the British and French, as well as the dominant
political discourse of isolationism within the United States.
Both France and Great Britain “furthermore ignored ethnic and religious realities for the
sake of their strategic interests; the possibility that any newly created Arab country could be
independent was beside the point. In fact, the dominant racial discourse at the time certainly
made it ridiculous for Europeans to entertain such independence. The belief that “the Arab
nations were incapable of governing themselves” was the norm. 53 And so were the French and
British Mandates built on lies and deep-seeded patronization of the indigenous Arabs.

The Mandates and the League of Nations
The Mandate System was not unique to the Middle East. After the First World War, the
League of Nations established Mandates throughout the former colonies and overseas
possessions of the empires who lost the war: Germany and Turkey. When the League of Nations
was first created (by the victors of World War I), Article 22 of the League’s charter called for the
creation of the Mandates in order to classify territories and peoples who were no longer ruled by
their former imperial sovereigns but were also not “able to stand by themselves under the
strenuous conditions of the modern world.” Article 22 further called for these territories to be
“entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their
geographical position can best undertake this responsibility.”54 The process to establish these
Mandates laid out by the League of Nations charter was quite simple: removing the authority of
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the former imperial power and supplanting it with that of one of the Allied Powers. The
Mandates were divided into three classes: The territories in the Middle East formerly controlled
by the Ottoman Empire were designated Class A Mandates, those who “... have reached a stage
of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized
subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time
as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal
consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.”55 The Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon falls
under this category. All former German colonies in West and Central Africa became Class B
Mandates, formerly referred to as Schutzgebiete (protectorates or dependencies) by the German
Empire, and were deemed to require a greater level of oversight and control by their new
Mandatory overseer: “the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory
under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion.”56 Class C Mandates
were a sort of “miscellaneous” category, which included former German colonies in Southwest
Africa and various islands in the Pacific.
Just as with the Crusades, it is equally essential to understand the motivations and
underlying ethos of those who established the Mandates. Unlike the Crusades, which ultimately
began because of the politicking and theological charisma of one man, Pope Urban II, the
Mandates were not influenced by one sole person, but rather driven by the prevailing myth of the
inherent superiority of European civilizations. From quoted sections of the League of Nations
Charter which established the Mandates, it is more than evident that the Allied Powers and their
agents believed that the people of the Mandates were simply unable to create and sustain
functioning countries. For these non-European peoples are supposedly unable to “stand alone.”
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Thus, from the beginning, the Mandates were rife with a sort of nefarious paternalism: the belief
that only Europe could serve as the guiding hand for these “dark” continents and countries.
These pseudo-sociological ideas were the norm in European academic and political thought in
the 19th and 20th centuries and subordinated non-European natives to “uncivilized” peoples who
needed the enlightening light of Europe. Until the decolonization of the Mandates, in the eyes of
European scholarship and hegemony, these regions lacked true civilization. Common historical
thought on this matter is exemplified by the British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, who wrote in
1963: “perhaps in the future there will be some African history to teach. But at present there is
only the history of Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness… and darkness is not the subject of
history.”57
Despite the clear pejorative and patronizing view of the autochthonous nations placed
under the Mandates, there were attempts by League of Nations officials to limit the extent to
which these Mandates could become colonies. For example, the League forbade Mandatory
powers to both construct military fortification in the Mandates and to raise an army. The
Mandatory powers were also required to submit annual reports on the status of their respective
Mandate(s) to an overseeing council within the League of Nations, the Permanent Mandates
Commission. While it seems as though the bureaucrats within the League of Nations did not
view the Mandates as true colonies, the same could not be said for the governing powers.58
French and British administrators and government officials in the Levant viewed the Mandatory
territories exactly as colonies and conquered territories.59 The French and British also often
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failed to cooperate with the Permanent Mandates Commission and other League of Nations
officials. French officials in Syria and Lebanon were known to simply refuse requests by the
League of Nations for specific information about the region.60 With the benefit of historical
hindsight, it is more than apparent that the French and British had colonial and imperial
ambitions in their new Mandatory territories, however, there seems to have been a great deal of
cognitive dissonance at the time of the Mandates’ establishment. The French and British bristled
at the prospect of directly ruling the Mandates, both believing this to be too expensive.
Moreover, direct rule was very unpopular, not only amongst the populations of the Mandates but
also within the metropolis as well.61 The Mandates came to resemble military occupation and
indirect rule via protectorates rather than true settler colonies. The only exception to this was the
British Mandate for Palestine, as Great Britain sponsored Jewish immigration and the
suppression of indigenous Palestinian Arabs.62 There were many within the League of Nations,
France, and Great Britain who opposed colonialism and did not wish to see the Mandates
become settler colonies, despite the prevailing views of paternalism toward non-Europeans.
Unfortunately, obligations placed upon France and Great Britain to encourage local autonomy
and statehood by the League of Nations meant very little in actuality. France, perhaps more than
Britain, held that Lebanon and Syria were simply the latest additions to France’s already
expansive empire. No effort was made to facilitate the development of new laws and certainly no
effort was made to nurture the institutions of autonomy and self-sufficiency.63
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The most elemental basis of the Mandates was outlined in Article 22 of the League of
Nations Covenant as a “sacred trust of civilizations.” The initial design for the Mandates,
whether by the naivete of the League or its own hubris, was for these Mandates to be temporary
institutions to “guide” burgeoning civilizations who were judged as not yet worthy to become
independent. Yet authority over these ostensibly ephemeral Mandates was granted to two
countries who maintained global empires and overseas colonies, both of which have had
historically poor reactions to the loss of territory and notions of self-government overseas.
France and Great Britain had no desire to relinquish control of the Mandates.

The Mandate for Syria
France’s control of its Mandatory territories began almost immediately on rocky ground.
Before officially organizing Syria and Lebanon into new protectorates, France first demanded
that Great Britain evacuate all its soldiers who remained in Syria and Lebanon after Ottoman
authority collapsed. Second, the French government had to deal with what were essentially new
colonial acquisitions whose inhabitants had already proclaimed independent governments despite
the ostensibly legitimate French Mandate for the region. The French government immediately
took to dismantle Arab nationalist states (mostly created in Syria) whose independence was
obviously not recognized by the French. This naturally led to a great deal of consternation in
Syria, and riots broke out in Aleppo and Damascus. Furthermore, religious tensions in Lebanon
also contributed to unrest in the region. Muslim inhabitants of Lebanon feared that France would
proclaim the creation of a Christian state. These fears were not unfounded, as France had
historically claimed that it was the rightful protector of Christians in the Middle East under
suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. While the Ottomans were gone, France maintained this
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historical claim as the basis for their control of the Mandate, specifically Lebanon with its larger
autochthonous Christian population.64
The nationalist tensions in Syria came to a boiling point in 1920, when Arab nationalists
in Syria declared the creation of an independent Arab Kingdom of Syria. The goals of the
nationalists were to secure the promises that the British and French had made to them during
World War I: the creation of a truly independent Arab state. The French government, seeking to
quell the rampant revolts throughout the region and crush nationalist sentiments, went to war
with the Arab Kingdom. The war only lasted a few months, ending in the capitulation of the
Syrian Arab nationalist government. While the Franco-Syrian War ended in 1920, the French
military spent the next three years fighting against other insurgencies. The end of the FrancoSyrian War led to the formal establishment of the French Mandate’s territorial make-up. France
established several client states to allow the French government to indirectly rule the region:
Greater Lebanon, the Alawite State, the State of Aleppo, the State of Damascus, and Jabal alDruze. Greater Lebanon laid the foundation for the modern country of Lebanon, whereas the
latter four states would later consolidate into one protectorate: the Syrian Federation (19221924), followed by the State of Syria (1924-1930) and later Syrian Republic (1930-1958).65
Parts of the French Mandate notably overlapped with the bygone Outremer. Cities such as
Beirut, Tripoli, Latakia, and briefly Antioch (now Antakya), which centuries earlier fell under
the domains of the crusaders, were now controlled by Mandatory French authority.
The division of the Mandatory territories based partly on religious and ethnic identity
(e.g. the Alawites and Druze gaining their own state) was done so in response to the initial
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dissent against French rule. The French sought to prolong their rule in the Middle East
indefinitely, despite the supposedly ephemeral nature of the Mandate System, and moreover
sought to limit future revolts.66 However, France’s willingness to give local autonomy to the
different ethnic groups of their new Mandate was quite limited. In the 1930s, the French
government refused petitions from non-Arab minority groups in Syria (Syriacs or Assyrians,
Kurds, and Circassians) to be granted special autonomy. These ethnic groups tended to be
cooperative with French authorities, as local leaders of these communities were wary of retaining
sovereignty living under a majority Arab Muslim state. These concerns fell on deaf ears.67
Just five years after the Franco-Syrian War, the French military would once again find
itself intervening in the region. In 1925, Syrian nationalists and local leaders regardless of
ethnicity and religion fought to expel French governance. Sunni Muslims, Druze, Alawite, and
Christian Syrians united under the banner of immensely popular Syrian nationalist Sultan Pasha
al-Atrash, who sought Syrian unity and independence. Al-Atrash condemned France’s decision
to divide the region into smaller client states, the extreme economic hardships that befell Syria
after France linked Syrian and Lebanese currency to the French franc, anti-Arab biases
demonstrated by French military officials and administrators, and perhaps most importantly: the
popular sentiment in the region that France’s supplantation of indigenous local leaders with those
from the French metropolis was an attempt to “de-Arabize” the region.68 French officials had
been inserted at every level of Syrian society, disrupting systems of local government which had
remained undisturbed for decades if not centuries. The French expected French to be spoken, and
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when this was impossible, translators were used. Thus, only the most imperfect understanding of
local norms was imparted to the French.69 The French had a pattern of assuming that indigenous
people lacked both the structures and the competence for self-government, and that part of their
civilizing mission was to impart that knowledge and gift those institutions. Thus, al-Atrash
declared the need for a revolution to free Syria from the French yoke.
The Great Syrian Revolt was initially a success, as the French were caught off guard by
the revolution and the fact that al-Atrash was able to unite such disparate groups across Syria.70
The French temporarily lost complete control over important cities such as Damascus, but the
French soon turned the tide in their favor. The French military was better equipped and trained
than the Syrian revolutionaries.71 Cities captured by al-Atrash’s forces were quickly retaken by
the French and eventually the rebels were pushed into the countryside. The French committed
numerous atrocities during the war, notably the aerial bombardment of civilian targets in both
cities and more rural areas. Bombing was so intense that some parts of Jabal al-Druze were
depopulated, and Damascus itself was bombed for 24 continuous hours.72 After two years, in
1927, the Great Syrian Revolt came to an end. French authority was reaffirmed, the leaders of
the revolt including al-Atrash either fled the country or were captured and sentenced by French
officials. In 1930, France unified all of the Syrian client states in the Mandate under the First
Syrian Republic, which would be its final form under French authority.
By the late 1920s and into the 1930s, it was more than apparent to the population of Syria
that the French had no intention of upholding the “sacred trust of civilization” outlined by the
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League of Nations. French Mandatory officials frequently rejected attempts to draft a
constitution for a theoretically independent Syrian state. One such draft for a constitution was
rejected in 1928 by the French because it contained language pertaining to Syria’s geographic
unity and did not sufficiently safeguard French authority and special privileges vis-à-vis
governance and economic intervention.73 Furthermore, the administration of the Mandatory
governments was heavily dominated by the French. Non-French Syrian authorities were given
very little power and did not have the authority to independently effect political change within
the Mandate. The small amount of power that local leaders had was ephemeral and could easily
be overruled by French officials. The French spared no expense to ensure that the people of the
Mandate would lack all political efficacy and have no self-sufficient, independent government.74
Indeed, after France had recaptured Damascus toward the end of the Great Syrian Revolt, the
Prime Minister of France at the time, Alexandre Millerand declared that Syria would be under
French control “the whole of it, and forever.”75

The Mandate for the Lebanon
French rule in Lebanon (or Greater Lebanon) saw far fewer conflicts than Syria. Part of
this is certainly due to the relative size of the two countries. Syria is far greater in terms of both
population and geographic size than Lebanon, which inevitably would lead to more conflict with
sudden occupation and rule by an imperial power. Perhaps the key difference between the
Lebanese and Syrian Mandates was the religious demography of each. A 1932 population census
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found that the population of Lebanon was almost evenly split between Muslims and Christians.
According to the census, the number of Lebanese Christians actually outnumbered Lebanese
Muslims (each religious group comprising approximately 51.2% and 48.8% of the population
respectively).76 By contrast, the population of the Syrian Mandate was overwhelmingly Sunni.
The French were greeted by some Christian groups in Lebanon as heroes and liberators, having
abolished the yoke of the Muslim Ottoman Turks. Conversely, the reception of French
governance in Syria was hostile from the outset. The Syrian population always viewed the
French as foreign invaders, but the Maronite Christians in Lebanon viewed the French as allies.
Such an alliance however greatly alienated the Muslim Lebanese population, who felt a greater
affinity with pan-Arabism rather than a strictly national Lebanese identity.77 It was this alienation
that contributed to the participation of some Lebanese Muslim sects (including Druze) in the
Great Syrian Revolt in 1925.
Due to its relatively large Christian population and the French mythos of serving as the
defenders of Middle Eastern Christians, the French government saw in Lebanon the perfect
opportunity to create a client state dominated by Christians. The French considered the local
Maronite Christian clergy to be their closest local allies in the region and so sought to give them
disproportionate influence in the Lebanese government.78 The first High Commissioner of the
Levant (the foremost representative of the French government in Syria and Lebanon), Henri
Gouraud created an Administrative Council to oversee governance in Lebanon. The members of
the council were chosen based on religious affiliation and sect. 66% of the seats were reserved

Rania Maktabi, “The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?,” British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies 26, no. 2 (1999): pp. 219-241, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530199908705684, 222.
77 Charles River Editors, The French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon: The History and Legacy of France’s
Administration of the Levant after World War I (Charles River Editors, 2019), 32-33.
78 Michael Provence, The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 89.
76

40
for Maronite Christians.79 Although Maronite Christians represented less than 30% of the
Lebanese population when the council was created, the alliance between France and the
Maronite clergy guaranteed this portion of the population disproportionate influence in the
government.80 It is nonetheless important to note, however, that although the French considered
their Maronite allies, the French administration did not view them as equals. Feelings of imperial
paternalism were ever-present in Lebanon. Henri Gouraud decreed at the time of the creation of
France’s Mandate for Greater Lebanon:
Insofar as France, in coming to Syria, has pursued no other goal than that of allowing for
the populations of Syria and (the) Lebanon to realize their most legitimate aspirations for
freedom and autonomy… That Greater Lebanon, thus fixed within its natural limits, will
be able to pursue as an independent state, to the best of its political and economic
interests, with the help of France, the program it has mapped out.81
The bedrock of the Mandate System, the League of Nations’ “sacred trust of
civilization,” as exemplified by the French, was anything but. The French government and its
agents in the Levant certainly did not consider their responsibilities to be “sacred” and trust
between any party in the region and France was rare. Even Christians who aligned with the
French mythos as defenders of Christians in the Middle East were not trusted with independent
self-rule. Syria and Lebanon are simply not European. To the French government, that could
only mean that the nations of the region could not support their own civilizations independent of
the French Empire.
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III.

Conclusion – Crusade and Mandate

Despite being separated from each other by over 800 years, the First Crusade and the
French Mandate share striking similarities. There is much overlap in territory between Crusader
States and the Syrian and Lebanese Mandates; both included cities such as Tripoli and Beirut.
The French Mandate and the Crusader States were also quite demographically similar. The
majority native population in both polities was Sunni Muslim and ethnically Arab. Likewise,
there were noticeable Christian and non-Arab minority groups who fell under the lordship of the
Mandate and the Crusader States. Lastly, the social and political hierarchy of both the French
Mandate and the Crusader States was dominated by French administrators who left the French
metropolis to oversee governance in the Levant. However, these similarities between the
Crusader States and the French Mandate are simply this: superficial. At first glance, one might
think that the Mandate and Crusade were similar institutions of conquest, imperialism, and
colonialism, but this is simply not true. The differences in motivation and governance in each era
are far more complex than overlapping demography and geography.
The difference in motivation of the First Crusade and French Mandate are best
understood in the context of religion. Those who participated in the First Crusade were
motivated by religious superstition and fear. The first crusaders considered themselves to be
armed pilgrims who had engaged themselves with the sacred duty to defend their Christian kin in
the Holy Land and restore that same territory to Christian rule. In so doing, the crusaders
believed that their souls would be sanctified and cleansed of sin. Conversely, for those in the
League of Nations and French government, the French Mandate was not necessarily a matter of
religion and certainly not a matter of religious salvation. The motivation of the French and their
counterparts in the League of Nations was paternal in nature, based on faux ideals of the
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Enlightened European and the backward native. According to the League and French
government, the people of the Levant were simply not capable of self-governance. It can be said
that there is some similarity how in both eras Christian Europeans looked down upon the Muslim
natives. Pope Urban II’s sermon at Clermont was so successful in rallying Europeans behind the
idea of a Holy War because it demonized Islam and the Muslims of the Levant. While such fiery
demagoguery is largely absent from the French Mandate, the French of the 2`0th century looked
down upon the indigenous Muslims as well. However, as aforementioned, the French also
considered the native Christians to be “junior partners” in the Mandatory hierarchy.82
Furthermore, neither the French Mandate nor the Crusades had grand design of religious
conversion or evangelism.
In terms of governance, there is some resemblance between the Crusader States and the
French Mandate. The Franks of the Crusader States established a hierarchy in the region with its
Muslim population at the lowest rung but did not do so out of such condescending and
pseudoscientific paternalism, rather because it was the oppressive feudal system with which they
were most familiar. Muslim administrators and more upper-class lords were ousted from
positions of power in both the Crusader States and the Mandate, but in the case of the former it
was to that the settled crusaders could gain new feudal estates amongst the spoils of their
conquests.83 Despite settlers coming from Europe, Muslims and non-European Christians still
comprised most of the population in the Crusader States and so were obligated by feudal contract
to work the land of their Frankish overlord. In the Syrian and Lebanese Mandates, autochthonous
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leaders were supplanted by the French because the French sought total control over the region
and did not believe the population to be ready for independent rule. These concepts were foreign
to the Franks and crusaders, even though they also rendered autochthonous peoples subordinate
to themselves.
The actual inner workings of the Crusader States and French Mandate were evidently
quite different as well. The Crusader States were truly de facto independent countries. The
Kingdom of Jerusalem, for example, was vassal to no other country and managed its own affairs
both domestic and international. Conversely, the states within the French Mandate were not
independent countries. France was always the ultimate suzerain of the Mandate. Greater Lebanon
could not manage its own foreign policy, nor could it manage its own domestic affairs without
intervention and significant oversight by its hegemon abroad. Likewise, the economies of
Lebanon and Syria were tied to France’s own, the French government linked the currencies of
each to the franc. Conversely, the Crusader States coined their own currencies and managed their
own economies and created independent markets for the exchange and consumption of goods.84
Language plays a key difference in Frankish and French governance as well. The
crusaders (and later the Franks) despite being dominated by the French were quite linguistically
diverse. According to chronicler Fulcher of Chartres:
And whoever heard such a mixture of languages in one army? There were present Franks,
Flemings, Frisians, Gauls, Allobroges, Lotharingians, Alemanni, Bavarians, Normans,
English, Scots, Aquitanians, Italians, Dacians, Apulians, Iberians, Bretons, Greeks, and
Armenians. If any Breton or Teuton wished to question me I could neither reply nor
understand.85
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The exact language used by the crusaders and the Franks as a lingua franca to overcome these
language barriers is not known for certain, however it likely would have been a descendant of
Vulgar Latin, specifically an early dialect of modern French.86 The Kingdom of France had quite
a prestigious royal court, whose culture was admired throughout medieval Europe. Many of the
crusaders, even if not ethnically French, would also have come from countries controlled by
French-speaking or langue-d’oïl-speaking peoples such as the Normans in England and Sicily.
Most of the native population in the Crusader States spoke Arabic in addition to minorities of
Armenian, Greek, and Shaz Turkic speakers, however French remained a language of the
nobility. In order to communicate with non-French speakers in the Levant, the Franks relied
upon interpreters and translators (who also served Muslim lords prior to and following the
Crusades) referred to as a “dragoman.”87 Neither the Franks nor the Crusaders impressed French
language upon the local populace. Conversely, a significant factor in the French governance of
the Mandates was the forced use of the French language. The French expected that their
language, and not Arabic, be used as much as possible in day-to-day life.88 Part of the anxieties
and unrest that caused the Great Syrian Revolt was the fear that the French were attempting to
subvert the Arabic culture of Syria and supplant it with their own.89
The crusaders and Franks were neither evangelists nor settler colonists, however the
sponsored settlement of the Levant by the Franks marks another key difference. Agents of the
Crusader States, whether they were independent citizens or wealthy military orders, funded the
creation of ports and new settlements within the Levant. While the Franks of the 11th century had
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no concept of colonialism (certainly not as we understand it), there was no over-arching goal to
replace the population of the Levant with Christian Europeans. The Crusader States exemplified
the workings of a colony, but not a settler colony. This distinction is very important, as in the
latter case, a settler colony is indicative of the genocide and replacement of indigenous groups
that occurred in the Americas. In the 20th century, neither France nor the League of Nations
sought to sponsor colonial enterprises akin to those that occurred in the Americas. The League of
Nations explicitly sought to avoid colonialism in the creation of the Mandate System, and France
did not fund the settlement of French citizens in the Levant. Recall the earlier quote from Fulcher
of Chartres (see page 23). No such colonial phenomena occurred during the French Mandate.
20th century France knowingly acted in shaping the French Mandate with the quintessence of
empire-building and paternalism, but the crusaders did not. For instance, the Franks did not seek
to convert or alter the culture and language of the indigenous nations to fit more closely that of
the Europeans because no such concepts of nationalism or “the nation” yet existed. It is because
of the French Mandate, not the Crusades, that Lebanon and perhaps Syria are considered
francophone countries. The Mandate certainly occurred much more recently however the French
Mandate actively sought to “francize” the region, a motivation which the crusaders did not share.
Herein lies the crux of the differences between the Franks of the Crusader States and the
French of the Levantine Mandates. Separated by more than 800 years, there were simply
concepts and ideas that would be alien and strange to each party despite sharing a religion and
(in most cases) ethnicity. The crusaders and later the Franks had no formalized concept of
colonialism, imperialism, or nationalism. With the benefit of historical hindsight, it is a simple
exercise to point at an institution of the Franks’ Crusader States and call it “colonialist” or
“imperialist” and it may very well be so, but these are modern theories. Does this contradict the
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idea that the Crusader States were a form of colonialism? No, however referring to the Crusades
as simply a form of proto-colonialism or early European colonization fails to consider how
contemporaneous people had no such concept thereof. More nuance is required.
The concepts of Crusade and Mandate are so fascinatingly similar and yet so different for
this reason; in tandem, the First Crusade and the French Mandate are somewhat of a dyad whose
similitudes tempt overlapping comparative historical themes and narratives, yet also resist
comparison by nature of the ontological anachronisms of the meaning we place on historical
schemata relative to those of contemporaneity.
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